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O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association: Why the Ninth 
Circuit Should Not Block the 
Floodgates of Change in College 
Athletics 
Michael A. Carrier* & Christopher L. Sagers** 
Abstract 
In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, then-Chief 
Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California issued a groundbreaking decision, 
potentially opening the floodgates for challenges to National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) amateurism rules. The 
NCAA was finally put to a full evidentiary demonstration of its 
amateurism defense, and its proof was found emphatically 
wanting. We agree with Professor Edelman that O’Bannon could 
bring about significant changes, but only if the Ninth Circuit 
affirms. We write mainly to address the NCAA’s vigorous pending 
appeal and the views of certain amici, and to explain our strong 
support for the result at trial. Reversal of Judge Wilken’s 
comprehensive and thoughtful decision would thwart needed 
changes just as colleges are beginning to embrace them and would 
be mistaken as a matter of law. O’Bannon is a correct, justifiable, 
garden-variety rule-of-reason opinion and should be affirmed by 
the Ninth Circuit. 
                                                                                                     
 * Distinguished Professor, Rutgers Law School. 
 ** James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law, Cleveland State 
University Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Copyright © 2015 Michael A. 
Carrier & Christopher L. Sagers. Portions of this response are adapted from 
Brief for Professors of Antitrust and Sports Law as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellees, O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015), 
which Sagers principally drafted and Carrier and Marc Edelman signed. 
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I. Introduction 
In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,1 then-
Chief Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California issued a groundbreaking decision, 
potentially opening the floodgates for challenges to National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) amateurism rules.2 The 
NCAA was finally put to a full evidentiary demonstration of its 
amateurism defense, and its proof was found emphatically 
wanting. O’Bannon is significant as that rarest of antitrust cases: 
a rule-of-reason challenge that not only reached the merits, but 
also provided a victory for plaintiffs. In his article, Professor Marc 
Edelman explains how the decision can be a gateway to more far-
reaching changes in college athletics, which could be attained 
through other lawsuits, unionization, or legislation.3 
                                                                                                     
 1. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 2. See id. at 985 (explaining that the plaintiffs challenged NCAA rules 
precluding “football players and Division I men’s basketball players from 
receiving any compensation, beyond the value of their athletic scholarships, for 
the use of their names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live game 
telecasts, re-broadcasts, and archival game footage”). 
 3. See generally Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-
Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
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We agree that O’Bannon could bring about those changes, 
but only if the Ninth Circuit affirms. We write mainly to address 
the NCAA’s vigorous pending appeal and the views of certain 
amici, and to explain our strong support for the result at trial. 
Reversal of Judge Wilken’s comprehensive and thoughtful 
decision would thwart needed changes just as colleges are 
beginning to embrace them and would be mistaken as a matter of 
law. One of us has conducted an empirical review of nearly every 
rule-of-reason case in the modern era,4 and on the basis of such 
analysis, we can comfortably describe O’Bannon as a correct, 
justifiable, garden-variety rule-of-reason opinion. A reversal by 
the Ninth Circuit, depending on how the opinion is written, could 
result in even a robust, well-supported evidentiary presentation 
not being enough for plaintiffs to win a rule-of-reason case, even 
when the anticompetitive effects are significant, obvious, and not 
outweighed by any legitimate justification.  
Part II of this response explains why antitrust law applies to 
the NCAA’s conduct.5 Part III contends that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents does not immunize the 
NCAA’s action.6 Part IV shows why the district court was correct 
in finding an antitrust violation.7 And Part V reveals how the 
                                                                                                     
2319, 2347–48 (2015). 
 4. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for 
the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, 
Rule of Reason in 21st Century] (reviewing 222 antitrust cases); Michael A. 
Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 
1265, 1272–73 (1999) [hereinafter Carrier, Real Rule of Reason] (reviewing 495 
antitrust cases). 
 5. Infra Part II. 
 6. Infra Part III. 
 7. Infra Part IV. This Response does not address the NCAA’s “antitrust 
injury” argument other than to note that, as plaintiffs have explained, “[t]he 
NCAA’s current contracts with television and cable networks (under which it 
reaps hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue annually) contain express 
provisions assigning Plaintiffs’ NIL [name, image, and likeness] rights.” 
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Opposition Brief in Response to National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’ns Opening Appellate Brief at 23, 40, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
v. O’Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter 
Plaintiffs’ Br.] (quoting, in addition, the statement of NCAA executive Oliver 
Luck that college athletes have a “fundamental right” to be compensated for use 
of their NILs); see also Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n at 35–36, 
O’Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2014) [hereinafter NCAA 
Br.] (making the “antitrust injury” argument by maintaining that there could be 
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plaintiffs’ framing of the O’Bannon case explains some of the 
criticisms of the district court’s decision.8 
II. Application of Antitrust Law 
On its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the NCAA claims that the 
challenged restraints “do not regulate commercial activity and thus 
are not within the scope of the Sherman Act.”9 It argues that the Act 
seeks to “prevent[] . . . restraints to free competition in business and 
commercial transactions”10 and that “[t]he NCAA’s amateurism rules 
do not effect any such restraint.”11 
But at the same time, the NCAA warns that if it cannot 
constrain “the commercial pressures of college sports,” then “an 
avocation [might] become a profession.”12 In lamenting potential 
“commercial pressures,” the NCAA concedes that it is engaged in 
business and subject to antitrust law. In any event, antitrust courts 
are not permitted to entertain such claims about professions. As the 
Supreme Court explained a century ago: “[R]estraints of trade 
within the purview of the statute . . . [can]not be taken out of that 
category by indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency or 
non-expediency of having made the contracts . . . .”13  
In the case on which the NCAA most directly relies, NCAA v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,14 the Supreme 
Court made clear that “the NCAA and its member institutions 
are . . . organized to maximize revenues” and are “[no] less likely to 
restrict output [to maximize profit] . . . than would be a for-profit 
entity.”15 With modern college athletics generating billions of dollars 
each year, this is even truer today than it was when the Court 
decided the case thirty years ago.16 
                                                                                                     
no application of the rules “that would deprive plaintiffs of NIL compensation”). 
 8. Infra Part V. 
 9. NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 32. 
 10. Id. (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940)). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2. 
 13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). 
 14. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 15. Id. at 101 n.22. 
 16. See Revenue, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD AFFIRM O’BANNON 303 
There is no good reason why antitrust law cannot apply to the 
NCAA. Antitrust applies without limitation to sports in general.17 It 
applies to higher education.18 And it applies to non-profit 
organizations.19 Just as colleges that conspire on scholarships must 
face antitrust scrutiny,20 so too must colleges that limit payment for 
student athletes. 
III. No Antitrust Immunity 
The NCAA also attempts to evade antitrust scrutiny by 
claiming that Board of Regents gives it a special immunity, 
rendering its amateurism rules “procompetitive and therefore 
valid under the Sherman Act as a matter of law.”21 And it 
maintains that “even if college sports has changed so 
dramatically since Board of Regents that the Supreme Court’s 
analysis no longer holds, the district court (and this Court) would 
still be bound by the decision.”22 
We think such a precedent of immunity would be a peculiar 
role for Board of Regents. The Court there found an antitrust 
violation from an NCAA plan that limited the number of college 
football games that could be televised and the number of games 
in which a single team could appear.23 The Court found that “[t]he 
anticompetitive consequences of th[e] arrangement [we]re 
apparent” because “[p]rice is higher and output lower than they 
would otherwise be[] and both are unresponsive to consumer 
                                                                                                     
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/revenue (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) 
(explaining that “college athletics programs annually generate about $6.1 billion 
from ticket sales, radio and television receipts, alumni contributions, 
guarantees, royalties and NCAA distributions”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See generally Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 
252 (1959). 
 18. See generally United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665–66 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 19. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 n.22. 
 20. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 679. 
 21. NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 14. 
 22. Id. at 28. 
 23. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 94. 
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preference.”24 Moreover, the Court found a violation under an 
abbreviated analysis that relieved plaintiffs of the need to show 
market power, as “the absence of proof of market power does not 
justify a naked restriction on price or output.”25 Nor would any 
“good motives . . . validate an otherwise anticompetitive 
practice.”26 
Indeed, in Board of Regents itself, “the NCAA [did] not rely[] 
on amateurism as a procompetitive justification,” and its counsel 
admitted during oral argument that it “might be able to get more 
viewers . . . if it had semi-professional clubs rather than amateur 
clubs.”27 Separately, even if there were anything to the purported 
immunity, Judge Wilken found “ample evidence . . . that the 
college sports industry has changed substantially in the thirty 
years since Board of Regents was decided.”28 
But most fundamentally, Board of Regents analyzed—and 
invalidated—rules relating to television broadcast rights that had 
nothing to do with athlete pay. Its statements about amateurism 
were plainly, obviously, dicta. Such dicta cannot overcome the 
results of a fully litigated trial that exhaustively considered the 
amateurism defense. The district court largely rejected the 
NCAA’s amateurism claims “after hearing the testimony of 23 
witnesses and considering 287 exhibits” in a “15-day bench trial 
that produced a transcript of 3,395 pages and a written decision 
of 99 pages.”29 
The NCAA grasps for the reed of Board of Regents, but a 
sentence of dicta does not displace an entire trial on the very 
issue of amateurism in which the court unmistakably found that 
the defense did not justify the challenged restraints.30 
                                                                                                     
 24. Id. at 106–07. 
 25. Id. at 109. 
 26. Id. at 101 n.23. 
 27. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 28. Id. at 999–1000; see also Plaintiffs Br., supra note 7, at 13 (quoting 
statement on NCAA’s website that “[a]s the scale of both revenue generation 
and spending has increased over the last few decades, there is a general sense 
that ‘big time’ athletics is in conflict with the principle of amateurism”). 
 29. Plaintiffs Br., supra note 7, at 2. 
 30. The NCAA’s reading of Board of Regents also is precluded by Ninth 
Circuit law. In Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 
1996), the Ninth Circuit applied a full rule-of-reason analysis to a factually 
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IV. Rule of Reason 
A. Framework 
The district court’s opinion fits comfortably into hornbook rule-
of-reason analysis. Courts relying on this framework engage in a 
burden-shifting analysis.31 First, plaintiffs must show a significant 
anticompetitive effect.32 Second, defendants must offer a 
procompetitive justification for the restraint.33 Third, the plaintiff 
can show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to attain the 
defendant’s objectives or that there are less restrictive alternatives 
to achieving the goals.34 The final stage of the analysis involves 
balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.35 
Of crucial importance, the effect of not making the showings at 
the various stages varies. If the plaintiff cannot show an 
anticompetitive effect, it loses because there is no harm to 
competition.36 And if the defendant cannot show a procompetitive 
justification, it loses because it cannot offer a reason for the 
restraint.37 
In the third stage, in contrast (and based on a review of nearly 
every rule-of-reason case in the modern era),38 if the plaintiff does 
not show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary or that there 
are less restrictive alternatives, it does not lose. A plaintiff’s showing 
at this stage typically allows it to win the case outright, avoiding a 
balancing analysis. After all, if the plaintiff could show that the 
                                                                                                     
indistinguishable restraint involving penalties for the violation of amateurism 
rules. It did so without discussing presumptions or special rules, and it cited 
Board of Regents as authority for its decision. Id. at 1318–19; see also Tanaka v. 
Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying rule of reason 
to restraint on student-athlete transfers among conference member schools). 
 31. See generally Carrier, Real Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 1268–69. 
 32. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 
F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 33. See, e.g., id. 
 34. See, e.g., id. 
 35. See generally Carrier, Real Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 1268–69. 
 36. Id. at 1268. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally Carrier, Rule of Reason in 21st Century, supra note 4. The 
surveys included every rule-of-reason case that a court decided from June 23, 
1977 to May 5, 2009. More recent cases do not alter the conclusions in the text. 
See generally Carrier, Real Rule of Reason, supra note 4. 
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restraint is not reasonably necessary to attain the defendant’s 
objective, it could be struck down. And if there is a less restrictive 
alternative that would allow a defendant to achieve its objective, 
then that alternative should be used because it allows the defendant 
to obtain its goals while being less restrictive of competition.39 
 
B. Anticompetitive Effect 
Judge Wilken first found that the plaintiffs demonstrated an 
anticompetitive effect. She found that NCAA Division I schools 
“compete to sell unique bundles of goods and services to elite football 
and basketball recruits” and that they “fixed the price of their 
product by agreeing not to offer any recruit a share of the licensing 
revenues derived from the use of his name, image, and likeness 
[(NIL)].”40 The restraint caused anticompetitive harm sufficient to 
satisfy plaintiffs’ initial burden because, “in [its] absence . . . , 
certain schools would compete for recruits by offering them a lower 
price for the opportunity to play [elite sports] while they attend 
college.”41 That injury is sufficient “even if [it did] not ultimately 
harm consumers,” as many courts have recognized such claims in 
the context of “market[s] for athletic services.”42 On appeal, the 
NCAA quibbles with this conclusion on several grounds, focusing 
among other things on output reductions and claims that de minimis 
price-fixing effects are acceptable.43 We think the court’s finding is 
well founded, and in any event not clearly erroneous. 
 
C. Procompetitive Justification 
                                                                                                     
 39. See Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1160 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“Because plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of advancing 
viable less restrictive alternatives, we reach the balancing stage.”); Carrier, Real 
Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 1343–44. 
 40. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 986, 989 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 41. Id. at 988. 
 42. Id. at 991–92. 
 43. NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 47 (arguing that challenged rules “would 
have a de minimis effect in the relevant market because they would limit only 
one minor (or non-existent) component of the bundle [of goods and services to 
athletic recruits], while competition in the overall relevant market remains 
robust”). 
NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD AFFIRM O’BANNON 307 
Once the plaintiffs made this showing, the burden shifted to the 
defendant to offer procompetitive justifications for its restraint. The 
district court rejected two of the NCAA’s four justifications: 
preserving competitive balance and increasing “output.”44 It did not 
completely reject the other two—promoting amateurism and 
integrating student-athletes into their campus communities—but, 
crucially, found them too insignificant to justify the challenged 
restraint: a complete ban on NIL revenues.45 
The most direct threat to the NCAA in future proceedings is the 
loss of the amateurism justification, a prized defense on which it has 
relied for decades. The district court found that its rules were 
“malleable” and had changed “numerous times.”46 And though the 
NCAA had the benefit of a full trial and substantial evidentiary 
demonstration, it failed to show that amateurism could “justify the 
rigid prohibition on compensating student-athletes . . . with any 
share of licensing revenue generated from the use of their [NILs].”47 
Similarly, the NCAA’s restrictions on NIL payments were not 
necessary to integrate student-athletes into their schools’ academic 
communities.48 The NCAA could not “use this goal to justify its 
sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation . . . from 
licensing revenue generated from the use of student-athletes’ 
[NILs].”49 
In short, the court found that the NCAA (1) could not use two of 
its four proposed justifications and (2) could not rely on the other two 
to support the restrictions at issue in the case.50 In other words, the 
plaintiffs demonstrated an anticompetitive effect, but the NCAA 
failed to offer justifications to explain its restriction.51 As a result, 
the anticompetitive effects predominated and the plaintiffs proved a 
successful rule-of-reason case. At that point, the court’s decision on 
liability was over. 
                                                                                                     
 44. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001–02, 1003–04. As for “increased 
output,” the NCAA argued that its rules provided colleges and elite student 
athletes more opportunities to participate in sports. Id. at 1003–04. 
 45. Id. at 1000–01, 1003. 
 46. Id. at 1000. 
 47. Id. at 1001. 
 48. Id. at 1003. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1000–04. 
 51. Id. at 1005. 
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D. Less Restrictive Alternatives 
To be sure, the court did not stop there. It crafted a remedy to 
address the anticompetitive harm and, in doing so, considered 
several alternatives that were less restrictive of competition but still 
could have achieved the NCAA’s objectives.52 What is key, however, 
is that the plaintiffs did not need to show such alternatives to 
succeed under the rule of reason. Their ability to offer less restrictive 
alternatives would help them win under the rule of reason. But such 
an offering is not necessary. A plaintiff’s showing of anticompetitive 
effects, together with a defendant’s failure to offer procompetitive 
justifications that would outweigh these effects, is enough for a 
plaintiff to win.53 
On this point, the amicus brief filed by Wilson Sonsini Goodrich 
& Rosati, P.C. on behalf of fifteen professors is not persuasive. The 
brief argues that “the Court should be able to conclude that the 
procompetitive benefits outweigh any alleged competitive harms 
without elaborate analysis” because promoting amateurism and 
integration of student athletes “are at the core of the NCAA’s 
mission” and that the plaintiffs “failed to identify a substantially less 
restrictive alternative to capping payments to players for promoting 
those aims.”54 Regardless of what the NCAA views as the core of its 
mission, the district court found that these justifications were barely 
acceptable and certainly did not justify the restraints in this case.55 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 1005–06 (noting that “the NCAA could permit . . . schools to 
award stipends to student-athletes up to the full cost of attendance” and “permit 
its schools to hold in trust limited and equal shares of its licensing revenue to be 
distributed to its student-athletes after they leave college”). 
 53. The NCAA and supporting amici spend a good deal of attention on the 
issue of less restrictive alternatives. See NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 54–60 
(devoting six pages to the issue); Brief for Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Appellant at 8–16, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. 
14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Wilson Sonsini Br.] 
(devoting nine pages to the issue). But (1) district courts enjoy broad remedial 
discretion in antitrust, (2) the court adopted a remedy recommended by 
plaintiffs, and (3) the NCAA waived any challenge to the remedy. See Brief for 
Professors of Antitrust and Sports Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees 
at 18, O’Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015) [hereinafter 
Robins Kaplan Br.] (discussing these points). 
 54. Wilson Sonsini Br., supra note 53, at 13–14. 
 55. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 986, 
1000–04 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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In addition, even if plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate a less 
restrictive alternative, that is not grounds for a plaintiff loss. It 
merely requires the court to balance anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects. And though it performed this balancing 
quickly, the O’Bannon court did just that in finding for the 
plaintiffs.56 
V. Framing of the O’Bannon Case 
Finally, we take minor issue with one point in Professor 
Edelman’s essay, which reflects a larger frustration with the 
O’Bannon litigation. While Professor Edelman supports Judge 
Wilken’s analysis, he faults her remedy.57 He is not alone, and other 
supporters of plaintiffs have made similar complaints.58 Professor 
Edelman contends that the court should “simply [have] enjoined the 
NCAA’s restraints outright,” by which he means it could have 
“entirely enjoined [its] ‘no pay’ restraints,” “simply recogniz[ing] 
                                                                                                     
 56. While the court found that amateurism “play[s] a limited role in driving 
consumer demand” for college sports that “might justify a restriction on large 
payments,” that rationale “[could] not justify the rigid prohibition on 
compensating student-athletes . . . with any share of licensing revenue.” 
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001. The court likewise found that integration of 
student-athletes into their campus communities could improve the education 
product they receive, but held that the NCAA’s outright ban was “[not] 
necessary to achieve these benefits.” Id. at 1003. For that reason, while 
“[l]imited restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help schools achieve 
this narrow procompetitive goal[,] . . . the NCAA may not use this goal . . . to 
justify its sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation . . . from 
licensing revenue.” Id. Finally, the NCAA’s argument that the district court’s 
“ill-conceived rule-of-reason analysis amounted to little more than asking 
whether college sports could still be commercially popular if it became 
something different from what it has long been,” NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 60, 
is a red herring that ignores the court’s crediting of anticompetitive effects and 
failure to find justifications that would outweigh these antitrust harms. 
 57. See Edelman, supra note 3, at 2343 (arguing that the court’s injunction 
was “limited and weak, as it failed to ameliorate the NCAA’s anticompetitive 
practices as effectively as possible”). 
 58. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to 
O’Bannon: The Need for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly 
Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 43, 50–59 
(2015), http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/A-
Rapid-Reaction-to-O.pdf (“Judge Wilken . . . invented a remedy of a $5,000 
annual cash payment to be held in trust” even though her “own antitrust 
analysis d[id] not support that decision.”). 
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that . . . [its] long-standing restraints on college-athlete pay far 
exceeded any alleged procompetitive justifications.”59 
We think that is unlikely. Antitrust courts have broad remedial 
discretion,60 but they tend not to award relief without evidentiary 
support.61 In this litigation, plaintiffs pled as their only injury the 
denial of revenue from NIL rights,62 and they tried the case 
accordingly. Aside from whether courts can or commonly do enter 
remedies substantially larger than plaintiffs themselves request, the 
record may well have been insufficient to support Professor 
Edelman’s desired remedy. Reversal of O’Bannon would be 
regrettable on any ground, including that of reaching beyond the 
plaintiffs’ case to award a remedy unsupported in the record. 
That said, we can understand Professor Edelman’s impatience. 
The emphasis in O’Bannon on NIL revenues explains the decision’s 
weaknesses. If the plaintiffs had litigated O’Bannon in broader 
terms, they could have won more significant relief, and could have 
simplified a complex case and a complex verdict. For example, 
pleading the case as a simple, labor-market monopsony63 would have 
obviated the court’s complicated analysis of harm in “group 
licensing” markets64 and would have deflected some of the NCAA’s 
red herrings, like its First Amendment defense and claims on 
antitrust injury.65 
                                                                                                     
 59. Edelman, supra note 3, at 2343–44. 
 60. See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
801–02 (7th ed. 2012). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Complaint at 62–68, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 
F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. CV-09-3329).  
 63. Indeed, two subsequent lawsuits are already pending before Judge 
Wilken that more directly challenge the no-pay model. See Complaint at 2, 
Jenkins v. NCAA, 3:14-cv-01678-FLW-LHG (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (seeking to 
overturn NCAA rules “placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to 
[college] athletes for their services”); Complaint at 1, 3, Alston v. NCAA, 3:14-cv-
01011-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014) (characterizing athletes as “essentially 
working full-time football jobs” and seeking to enjoin “the present NCAA Bylaw 
that limits financial aid to the presently-defined [limits]”). The Alston case was 
filed in the Northern District of California and initially assigned to Judge 
Wilken, and both Jenkins and Alston have been transferred to a multi-district 
litigation docket pending before her, styled In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid 
Cap Antitrust Litig., 4:14-md-02541-CW (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014). 
 64. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 993–99. 
 65. For critiques of these arguments, see supra note 7 and Robins Kaplan 
Br., supra note 53, at 3 n.4. We do not criticize plaintiffs’ counsel for taking the 
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But a larger point is that none of this is relevant to the matter 
at hand. Judge Wilken’s decision was appropriate to the case as it 
was pled and tried and was supported by the record. While we can 
sympathize with Professor Edelman’s desire for a more robust 
remedy, no one can doubt the significance of the liability finding and 
the role this can play in future developments that could result in 
more expansive remedies. 
VI. Conclusion 
Professor Edelman is correct that O’Bannon can be a building 
block for future efforts to increase student-athletes’ ability to recover 
revenues from their labors. But that will only come to pass if the 
district court’s decision is upheld. If the Ninth Circuit overturns the 
fully supported ruling, that moment will be gone, and college 
athletes will have lost their opportunity to be compensated for the 




                                                                                                     
approach they took, which likely reflected the interests of named plaintiff Ed 
O’Bannon, who was frustrated when he saw his own likeness in a video game, 
see Transcript at 26–27, O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. CV-09-3329) 
(testimony of Edward O’Bannon, explaining his initial motivation to sue), as 
well as the views of long-time Nike executive and basketball organizer Sonny 
Vaccaro, who largely initiated the litigation. See Jon Solomon, How Sonny 
Vaccaro Accidentally Created the Ed O’Bannon Case, CBSSPORTS.COM, (June 6, 
2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24581965/ho
w-sonny-vaccaro-accidentally-created-the-ed-obannon-case (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015) (explaining the evolution of the O’Bannon trial strategy) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Practical considerations may have counseled 
against the simpler, more aggressive strategy, as O’Bannon (even though it led 
to a series of amateurism challenges) had few predecessors at the time it was 
filed and litigated. See id. (asking whether courts were “ready for this suit”); 
supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing pending subsequent lawsuits 
that more directly challenge the no-pay model). 
